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 Democracies, Autocracies, and Political Stability 
Since the third wave of democratization, many scholars have debated whether or not 
there exist necessary prerequisites for the consolidation of democracies. In fact, democratic 
transitions toward democracy cannot occur without the state achieving a semblance of 
‘stateness,’1 as a state that has various ethnic groups or polarizing cleavages may bring about 
political instability, which will make it unlikely for democracy to endure. Giovanni Sartori 
argues that democracy cannot arise in societies that are prone to internal conflict.2 What a 
country needs before it can experience the advent of democratic politics is domestic security 
within its borders. A growing number of scholars, on the other hand, claim that the causal 
relationship is reversed. Samuel Huntington3, Juan Linz4, and Guillermo O’Donnell5  all argue 
that democracies are prone to political instability primarily because they invite political 
pluralism. In other words, the large presence of interest groups and the mobilization of 
independent associations can likely weaken the state from carrying out its capacity to govern 
effectively. When economic modernization outpaces the development of democratic political 
institutions, the likelihood for the emergence of political order and stability become highly 
unlikely. As a result, coups, revolutions, and the breakdown of democratic institutions is a likely 
scenario in highly democratic regimes. This article addresses the fundamental empirical question 
of whether nation-states that are more democratic are more likely to be politically stable or 
unstable over time.  
Using a global model of 122 nation-states, the cases included represent a variety of 
countries that experienced a legacy of colonialism, and accordingly are likely candidates to be 
praetorian states in the Huntingtonian sense: states that are prone to strong-armed governments 
and political instability.6 A majority of the states in the study are also considered patrimonial 
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 states where government officials look at political offices and the natural resources of their 
country as exploitable rents that can be plundered for private personal gain or as a means to favor 
a particular ethnic or religious group. Due to the nature of client-patron relations and high levels 
of corruption, these patrimonial states are prone to low levels of economic growth and hence are 
more prone to higher levels of political instability, in particular the collapse of civilian 
governments through civil wars,  military intervention, political unrest, or prolonged 
insurrectionist movements.7  
A number of empirical works demonstrate the negative effect of democracy on political 
stability. Bingham Powell establishes the linkage on how democracies fall prey to large-scale 
political unrest.8 In his study of twenty-eight nation-states during the 1958-1976 period, he finds 
that nation-states that had high levels of multi-party democracy experienced large-scale 
instability in terms of political violence, strikes, rallies and protests. Since most of the nascent 
democracies did not have party systems that are institutionalized, extremist groups took 
advantage of the weakness of the current political system and brought about political mayhem in 
the streets that weakened the legitimacy of elected governments. Alessina and Perroti show that 
democracies are prone to large scale instability primarily because sectorial interests in a 
pluralistic setting may bring about large scale income inequality.9  They found that democracies 
are likely to generate higher levels of income inequality (measured by the share of the third and 
fourth quintiles of income among a population). Thus, democratic systems are prone to generate 
social discontent, which facilitates socio-political instability. As such, there is an indirect 
relationship of income inequality causing a decrease of private and public investments.  They 
predicate the inverse relationship between socio-political instability on democracy based on 
uncertainty – such that private entrepreneurs are discouraged from continued investment in a 
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 nation-state blighted by assassination attempts, coup plots, and a high death rate based on 
domestic disturbances.  
Despite the empirical evidence concerning democracy’s inability to reign in political and 
social order, other scholars suggest that democracies promote political stability in many ways. 
First, democracies are known to provide a pacifying effect on social unrest by allowing citizens 
to express dissatisfaction with the incumbent regime through the electoral process.10 Second, 
democracies are known to provide a smooth transition from one elected leader to another without 
political violence.11 Third, democratic regimes are known to be responsive to citizen needs and 
the demands of the electorate which generates accountable, transparent, and efficient 
governance.12 Democracies, due to the accompanying freedom of speech, are more reactive to 
social problems before they lead to the destabilization of the state.13 Fourth, democracies are 
known to value the pluralistic nature of ideas. Thus, democratic systems aim to settle political 
conflict through meaningful debate and civilized discourse, leading to cultural values of 
consensus seeking and compromise building, which can offset political instability coming from 
minority groups in society.14 Fifth, democratic states allow citizens to exercise their right to 
show displeasure about state policies without restraint from state authorities. This functions as a 
safety valve that allows collective dissent to be organized, civil, and work under the rule of law, 
thus obviating large scale demonstrations that can weaken state legitimacy.15 Sixth, scholars 
allude to how democratic regimes are known to generate economic progress and development 
more so than autocracies, thus leading to higher levels of citizen satisfaction with their quality of 
life. 16  
The task of this article is to address an empirical conundrum: Does democracy promote 
political instability or does it have institutional mechanisms that induce political order? This 
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 study allows us to go beyond the limitations of empirical studies that have made the link between 
democracy and politically instability. For instance, the empirical studies previously mentioned 
are not truly cross national in scope and thus do not allow one to make generalizations as to 
whether or not regime type has an enduring effect on levels of political stability. Powell’s study 
largely examines twenty-eight developed states, with most of them European.17 Alessina and 
Perotti’s study are cross-sectional regressions examining seventy states, half of which are 
economically developed countries in the Northern Hemisphere.18 The findings of this project add 
to the scholarly conversation and provide a contemporary empirical testing of the question. This 
article shall utilize a large cross-national study consisting of developing states which are at 
highest risk of political unrest to answer this question.  
This article examines 122 developing states that vary in terms of their level of ethnic and 
religious fractionalization, which can affect their level of democratic development and political 
stability. These countries are located in disparate regions of  the world: from developing Asian 
countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia,  Myanmar,  India, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; to African patrimonial states like Nigeria, Kenya, the Republic 
of Congo, and Zimbabwe; to Latin American polities that had varied experiences with civilian or 
military dictatorships (like Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Chile) and those with 
a long tradition of democracy (Costa Rica and Colombia); and post-communist polities like 
Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus, Kazakhstan, which all share a socialist past. The analysis involves a 
set of countries that endured a variety of regime types: from illiberal to liberal democracies to 
civilian, personalistic, and military dictatorships, one-party autocratic rule, totalitarian rule, and 
monarchical and sultanate type autocracies (like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman). Hence 
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 the case selection gives this study an opportunity to test if higher levels of democracy are 
conducive to political instability. 
This article proceeds in six parts. The first part reviews literature that links democracy (as 
a regime system) to political instability. The second part discusses why dictatorships are likely to 
have a semblance of political stability over time. The third section offers theories as to why 
democracies should experience higher levels of political stability. The fourth part provides a 
brief overview of the variations in the levels of democracy among the cases. The fifth section 
provides a set of hypotheses, conceptualizes and operationalizes the variables, and discuss the 
results. The last part of the study concludes and offers theoretical insights.  
Linking Democracy to Political Instability 
One of the earliest studies documenting how democracies may not be a good regime 
system for many states that just endured the decolonization process was Samuel Huntington’s 
Political Order in Changing Societies.19 Huntington warns that democracies can breed instability 
primarily if a country has not developed high levels of political development. What he means by 
political development is the successful creation of political parties that are capable of translating 
popular demands into policy proposals that the government can implement. Huntington argues 
that the rapid development of the industrial economy and the rapid economic modernization that 
it entails may place a stress on democratic institutions. Simply put, nascent democracies cannot 
respond to mass public demands and expectations. Furthermore if economic development and 
the pluralism of groups outpace the development of state institutions, political instability may 
occur –which can eventually lead into long-term authoritarian phases.  
Huntington adds that modernization, together with democratic pluralism, can lead to a 
disruption of the traditional social groupings of society and an increase in social isolation as 
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 individuals become more geographically mobile. This tendency to move from rural to urban 
areas increases the potential for social alienation of the public and the type of vulnerability that 
can lead people to join extremist groups. Huntington also alludes to a structural-strain argument. 
As democracy leads to rising and falling incomes, generating large scale income inequalities, 
people tend to develop higher expectations for social mobility, and when the state is incapable of 
meeting rising demands for economic access and social mobility, personal grievances against the 
existing social order may be manifested through turbulence in the streets and the increased 
oppressiveness of the state. 
This is the same sentiment expressed by Juan Linz in his early work on democracy.20 In 
the Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Linz warns democracies are likely to experience the 
pluralism of interest groups that can weaken the capacity of the state to maintain social order and 
implement sound policy aimed at redistributing resources and addressing social problems. As 
groups and factions not within the state are allowed to participate in the polity, Linz warns that 
this may actually decrease the legitimacy of the state in the long term. Linz noted that interest 
group hyper-pluralism can lead to the periodic breakdown of democracies. 
Guillermo O’Donnell’s work on how authoritarian polities emerged in South America 
reaffirms Linz’s instability theory on why republics in the region sometimes reverted back to 
authoritarian episodes.21 He argues that populist democracies are inherently plagued by the 
mobilization of populist societal groups that can exert an inordinate amount of pressure on elite 
interests. Populist pressure facilitated the rise of military juntas and oppressive dictatorships in 
South America. The rise of dictatorships and military juntas directly relates to the formation of 
populist sentiments that democratic politics may stir. 
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 Similarly, the rise of democratic politics may even bring about economic 
underdevelopment that may facilitate long-term political instability. Mancur Olson also argues 
that special interest groups may apply pressure on the central government to privilege certain 
sectors of society, leading to the disenfranchisement of others.22 Many democratic governments 
may accord these groups key positions in government and craft policy that is advantageous to 
one group and inimical to other groups. This disproportionate allocation of goods, resources, and 
social services may trigger social rigidities and class conflict leading to long-term political 
instability. 
 Without a doubt, democracies may ignite coups. In developing countries from 1970-
1990, many democratic states entertained socialist policies such as the redistribution of wealth, 
income, and property to appease citizens that had long endured episodes of a hierarchical and 
elitist class system. This facilitated the rise of the military as a politicized institution that was 
largely reactionary and instigated rightist coups against democratic regimes.23  Gupta discovers 
that polarized class tensions are always apparent in democracies. A political crisis arises when a 
particular class demands wealth redistribution, which can increase the prospects of military 
intervention in civilian politics.24  
Such democratic states may in fact pay lip-service to the demands of populist orientations or 
ideologies leading to the virtual expropriation of the wealth and property of the elites. Most of 
the military in third world democracies shared the ideological interests of the elite class, in 
particular the investing class who wanted to preserve their property rights from state attempts at 
distributing resources equitably. The military became the servant of elite interests, and it became 
interventionist when the state began to espouse public policies that threatened to nationalize and 
expropriate private and personal property.25 Furthermore, the military did not intervene when 
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 elite interests were secured from populist pressures.  For example, in several African 
democracies generals intervened when states began to promote socialist ideologies that 
threatened elite interests.26  
Coups that arise from wayward democracies are known as veto coups, wherein the military 
asserts its vanguard role in controlling the redistributive demands coming from pressures from 
the political left in a democratic system. These veto coups became paramount in Latin America 
beginning with the removal of the populist dictator Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic in 
1963, but they  only became more commonplace after the removal of Salvador Allende by 
General Pinochet in 1972, continuing well into the late 1980s in the rest of Latin America. The 
rise of veto coups spread throughout the world much in response to democratic regimes that 
infringed on the interests of the elite. In such regimes, the property less individuals would place 
political pressure on politicians, by instigating unrest and political protest. As the government 
became more sensitive to the interests of the average citizen (who did not possess property), they 
implemented reforms, including redistribution of land and higher taxes for the rich. This often 
triggered the elite to court the military institution to launch a coup to veto “out” populist policies 
that curtailed the economic liberties and social dominance of an elite base.27   
Democracies and Ethnic Dominant Minorities 
 Amy Chua’s recent work on market-dominant minorities warns that the advent of parallel 
transitions to democracy and a capitalistic system are inimical to political stability.28 Through 
various case studies, she argues that many democracies that attempt to initiate neo-liberal 
economic reforms are prone to political violence. As one ethnic minority dominates the 
economic sectors of society, this leads to a wage gap crisis, unemployment, and the large-scale 
economic marginalization of an ethnically dominant class. When this occurs, there is an ethnic 
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 majority backlash that can threaten the stability of democratic politics. For instance, the large 
scale riots in Indonesia, which targeted the ethnic Chinese community during the post-Suharto 
period, characterized the nature of the political violence that market dominant minorities in 
democracies can bring.  
There are many democracies that are prone to electing to government ethnic minority 
groups that may have democratic aspirations. However, these democratic regimes do not survive 
because ethnic majority groups not in power mobilize actively to topple them, as a heightened 
sense of nationalism compels them. Accordingly, nationalism is such a pervasive force that 
majority groups not in power will do everything in their capacity to oust democratic minority 
governments by force because minority democratic rule is an “intolerable breech of political 
propriety.”29  Minority groups that hold political power will lead to the creation of ethnic blocks 
and the continued ethnicalization of political competition. 30 A political culture of mistrust and 
intolerance develops which makes it difficult for political stability to arise. 
Democratically elected minority presidents are susceptible to employing client-patron 
relations in governance. Such ethnically divided societies may have democratic regimes that tend 
to enact policies that do not promote the public good. Public service provision tends to be catered 
to one narrow clientelistic group, especially when an ethnic minority group is in power. When 
minority groups are in power, they also do not engage in policy activism. Granted, policies that 
promote a more equitable distribution of wealth and resources may lead to one group losing 
inordinate amounts of political and economic power; hence minority groups are prone to 
maintain the status quo ante. Therefore, there is a tendency for fractionalized democratic 
societies to formulate policies that promote status quo initiatives that do not empower or improve 
the quality of lives of citizens—specifically those who are traditionally marginalized or 
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 historically excluded from the political system. Naturally, this promotes higher levels of political 
discord. 
The nature of client-patron relations in developing democracies is also clearly apparent in 
neo-patrimonial regimes in Africa where “the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than to 
an office.”31 Such neo-patrimonial attachments dictate that chief executives grant personal favors 
and material inducements to their ethnic kin, while ethnic rivals are denied full political access. 
Ethnic political patrons that have access to political power also form a durable relationship of 
favoritism with their ethnic group. To a certain extent, this relationship of dependency generates 
large scale political and economic losses to ethnic groups that are the ethnic rivals of presidents 
and prime ministers. Furthermore, powerful chief executives who are members of a minority 
group plunder state resources to grant political favors.32 These neo-patrimonial ties have also 
been conceptualized as prebendalism. Thus, the political and legal system becomes favorable to 
the ethnic group of the chief executive—largely eroding the political identity, civil liberties, and 
economic freedoms of disfavored ethnic groups.33 Such exclusion, especially if it becomes 
institutionalized, is prone to facilitating protracted political violence among clashing ethnic 
groups. 
Why Dictatorships Are More Stable Over Time 
 
 Naturally, dictatorships are logically capable of maintaining a semblance of political 
order over time because of their virtual monopoly on violence and their capacity to restrain and 
suppress political dissent with outmost ferocity. They can withstand pressures from civil society 
either by co-opting its agenda through corporatism, or its outright purging from the political 
system.34 In authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, there is no significant political pluralism that 
can threaten the entrenched de jure and de facto monopoly on political power by political elites.  
10
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  Many states in the Middle East and Africa resisted the forces of democratic change 
because of the dominance of the Rentier state economic system. By harnessing the wealth 
associated with oil, autocratic states were able to pacify mass public demands for accountable 
governance with entitlement and social welfare programs that financially protected citizens. Oil 
wealth allowed many states to lessen or eliminate the burden of taxation, thus facilitating the 
creation of a dictatorial redistributive state. Fareed Zakaria argues that such Rentier state 
economic systems are responsible for the long-term political stability of autocracies.35 As 
citizens are given free benefits and social inequities are dealt with appropriately by state 
agencies, the public remains silent and does not apply pressure on the state in terms of enacting 
political reforms. If there are no demands for changes in the political system, such autocracies 
continue their monopoly on political power. Thus Rentier state autocracies remain politically 
stable over time.36 
 Recent empirical analysis shows a more blurred picture on the relationship between 
autocracies and long term political stability. According to research conducted by Przeworski and 
his co-authors, if autocrats cannot control dissent against the state, such regimes are more likely 
to collapse because any threat to legitimacy of the ruler may bring about capital investment flight 
and economic decline, thus opening up the space for political dissent that can usher in prolonged 
periods of political instability and ultimate regime change.37 
The Relationship between Democracy and Political Stability 
Despite works documenting how democracies are prone to political instability, there is 
research to suggest that this perspective is largely incorrect. Robert Dahl’s work on democracy 
established how democratic systems are more inherently stable than autocratic systems. For 
instance, democratic states allow for citizens to contest the state within the rule of law, allowing 
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 a safety valve upon which citizens can show dissatisfaction or resentment against state policies 
without actively destabilizing or overthrowing the state.38 Countries with a longer democratic 
experience also benefit from a safety net that absorbs citizen dissent and political conflict. That 
safety net is the existence of contentious politics that is inherent in democracies with free, fair, 
and competitive elections. They allow mass citizenries to vent their frustration at the ballot box 
rather than in the streets. This also allows contending groups the opportunity to articulate their 
grievances in an open space where they can openly influence political outcomes without 
resorting to subversive acts. 
 Democratic polities strengthen political stability in three ways. First is through legalistic 
norms that prohibit the state from making arbitrary decisions as mentioned by the sociologist 
Max Weber.39 In autocracies, arbitrary decisions by the state may trigger political turbulence for 
an already oppressed group or segment of the population. This can range from arbitrary arrests 
without due process, forced abductions or disappearances of civilians, or the sudden 
expropriation of wealth and property. Second, in democracies property rights and the 
enforcement of contracts are more secure.40 For example, democratic systems lessen the 
possibility of the state expropriating the property of civilians or repudiating their private 
transactions.41 Overall, this lessens political turbulence because it promotes the economic well-
being of the majority of the population – inducing them not to rebel against the state.42  Thirdly, 
democracies are known to be conducive to higher levels of economic development and macro-
economic stability. Such regimes, it is argued, systematically leads into the consolidation of 
democratic politics even in ethnically fragmented states.43 Autocracies, on the other hand, are 
more likely to be politically unstable over time by the nature of its institutional features and 
reliance on oppression and arbitrary decisions. 
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 Hypotheses 
At the outset, the theoretical section of this article explicated a research question, which 
the following hypothesis attempts to answer:  
Main Hypothesis 1: Developing states with higher levels of democracy are prone to 
higher levels of political instability. 
Although this is seen from the perspective of scholars who believe democracy spurs 
populist tendencies and sectorial mobilization can destabilize the state,44 other scholars like Mark 
Lichbach45  also formulate a countervailing theory arguing that the use of increasing repression 
by dictatorships can lead into large scale political violence. Hence it is also possible that 
autocracies are more likely to be politically unstable.  
A series of sub-hypotheses will help to examine the role of other variables in affecting 
variations on the levels of political stability among developing states. For example, extant 
research demonstrates how political stability is affected by several variables, including ethnic 
fractionalization, religious fractionalization, variations of levels of economic affluence, and 
institutional features, which include parliamentarism and federalism. As discussed previously, 
democracies are known to become chronically unstable because of the emergence of ethnic 
dominant minorities who hold a larger share of the national wealth. This phenomenon draws 
resentment from a country’s large ethnic-dominant minority population. Thus, levels of ethnic 
fractionalization may induce political unrest among nation-states.46 Hence, sub-hypothesis 1: 
Ethnically fractionalized states are more likely to experience higher levels of political instability. 
Likewise, religious fractionalization, which afflicts most countries in the developing 
world (as a result of colonial powers drawing borders not reflecting primordial religious 
identities and sectarian divisions), may trigger higher levels of political unrest. Research by 
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 Collier and Hoeffler47  found that religiously divided polities are more likely to experience civil 
conflict over time. Thus, sub-hypothesis 2: Religiously fractionalized states are more likely to 
experience higher levels of political instability. 
Economic affluence, as reflected by variations in a country’s Gross National Product may 
also be a primary factor in triggering political unrest. Dipak Gupta finds that countries with 
lower levels of economic affluence and economic development are more likely to face social 
rigidities, upon which the population is prone to higher levels of economic dislocation as a result 
of pervasive income inequities.48 Thus, poorer countries are likely to experience a large mass 
base of the population experiencing relative deprivation vis-à-vis a minority in the population that 
own most or have a greater share of a country’s wealth. This relative deprivation may manifest 
itself through large scale violence which may affect the state’s ability to govern and reign in 
political order.  Countries that are not economically developed are chronically politically 
unstable, which is reflected in sub-hypothesis 3: States which are economically underdeveloped 
are more likely to experience political instability. 
Scholars in comparative politics have also begun to look at the role of institutions in 
facilitating political order and stability. Research by Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach,49 Juan 
Linz,50 and more recently by John Gerring, Strom Thacker, and Carola Moreno,51 empirically 
find that parliamentary systems are more politically stable over time compared to presidential 
systems. This is due to parliamentary systems being more consensus-oriented due to coalitional 
politics. Parliamentary systems also allow for multi-partism in national governance which can 
defuse ethnic or religious tensions. They also have heads of governments that can simply be 
removed by a single vote of non-confidence and not have executives that need to serve fixed 
terms. Hence, such systems are less likely to experience coup d’états and military adventurism to 
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 remove inefficient leaders. Furthermore, parliamentary systems are more likely to produce career 
oriented politicians that have loyalty and experience, compared to political amateurs that 
presidential systems may bring. It is also recognized that parliamentary system, because they are 
more cohesive and unified organizationally, are less prone to bureaucratic gridlock and are more 
likely to initiate much needed economic reforms without a protracted stalemate between divided 
branches. Lastly, parliamentary systems are likely to avoid political instability because they are 
more likely to enhance higher levels of economic, human and social development.52  Thus, the 
sub-hypothesis 4: States that have parliamentary systems are more likely to be politically stable.  
Federalism is also an institutional variable that is recognized to have a longstanding 
effect on political stability. Scholars have generated mixed findings on its ability to reign in 
political order. For instance, Erik Wibbels finds that federalism may in fact generate fiscal 
irresponsibility on the part of the national government as sub-national units overspend and are 
more likely to avoid the costs of fiscal adjustment.53 Federal states are more likely to experience 
higher levels of macro-economic instability and are less likely to initiate economic reforms 
aimed at curbing inflation, unemployment, and sound monetary policies. As a result, federal 
states are more likely to be politically unstable over time. However, scholars like Lemco54  and 
Filippov and his co-authors55  note how federalism promotes subsidiarity governance, upon 
which nation-states divided by ethnicity and religion give autonomy to their local regions, states 
and provinces, granting such sub-national units the ability to construct their own taxing, 
education and spending policies. Thus, federal states are more responsive to the demands and 
needs of their local constituents. Over time, the federalist principle of giving self-determination 
to peripheral regions has a pacifying effect on political unrest. This supports sub-hypothesis 5: 
States that have federal systems are more likely to be politically stable.  
15
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 Data and Methods 
This paper seeks to empirically solve two questions: (1) Do higher levels of democracy 
promote higher levels of political instability and (2) Are autocracies are more likely to promote 
higher levels of political stability. 
It is important to describe the nature of the data and methods used in this research. First, 
the operationalization of the democracy variable is author-created utilizing democracy indices 
provided by several prominent organizations involved in the study of democracy. Second, the 
study involves 122 developing states. For some of the regression models the number of states 
was dropped to 101 because the Political Risk Rating measure (one of the dependent variables 
used) is not available for some countries. Third, several measures are utilized to operationalize 
levels of democracy and the extent of political stability as a way to add robustness to the results. 
The Freedom House Index56 for the years 1974-2006 measures levels of democracy   as a 
proxy for a maximalist definition of democracy.57 Empirical evaluations of the scores collected 
since 1974 show that it is consistently correlated with other democracy indices from other 
sources, in particular the Polity IV index and the Vanhanen index.58The Freedom House Index 
has two scores: one on the degree of political freedoms of citizens (the right to free and fair 
competitive elections, the right to political action, etc.) and the amount of civil liberties that 
citizens have in each state (the right to protest, hold rallies, freedom of speech, and freedom of 
religion). The average of both scores is derived which is ranked from a range of 1 to 7.  The 
scores are reversed for the sake of clarity and ease of presentation, with higher scores (such as 7) 
connoting higher levels of democracy, while lower score (such as 1) denoting lower levels of 
democracy. The averages of the two scores are computed which proxies for the prevailing level 
of democracy for each state over a 32 year period. As shown in Table 1, countries in Asia have 
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 an average score of 3.9 out of the 7 point democracy scale of the Freedom House index, 
indicative that the region still has a substantial number of illiberal states that deprive their 
citizens of basic political rights and freedoms.  For example, North Korea still has a personalistic 
totalitarian dictatorship under the Juche ideology of Kim Jong Il’s successor Kim Jong Un. 
Cambodia still has to deal with the remnants of a long civil war, rendering its parliamentary 
government incapable of guaranteeing full civil and political rights to its citizens. Nepal has also 
scored quite low on the scale primarily because of the threat of a Maoist insurgency movement 
and the autocratic tendencies of the state. The military regime in Myanmar which grabbed power 
from Aung-Sang Su Kyii still deprives its citizens the opportunity to protest. The junta regime 
has also continuously denied the Burmese of free, fair and competitive elections since British 
independence. Laos, Vietnam and China are still ruled by a predominant Communist party 
system that has denied their citizens a fair choice in choosing their political leaders. Lastly, 
Malaysia scores low on the Freedom House scale primarily because of the predominance of a 
one party state under the aegis of the United National Malay Organizations that has used 
intimidation tactics against the political opposition particularly the oppositionist Anwar Ibrahim.  
Table 1 Average Democracy Scores of World Regions and Rankings  
 
Freedom House Score Vanhanen Democracy 
Index   
Democratic Age 
(Polity IV) 
 
 
Asia 
 
3.92 (3) 
 
6.570 (3) 
 
5.931 (3) 
 
Africa 3.68 (4) 3.301 (4) 4.347 (4)  
 
Latin 
America/Caribbean 
5.40 (2)  
11.953 (1) 
 
20.583 (1) 
 
Europe 5.49 (1) 7.973 (2) 8.727 (2)  
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 Middle East 3.48 (5) 1.015 (5) 0.250 (5)  
*The rankings are in parentheses 
In Latin America, most of the countries scored above the midpoint of 3.5 (with an 
average of 5.40 out of the 7 point democracy scale of the Freedom House index), with the 
exception of Cuba, where a dictatorship still thrives. This shows that the region is mostly 
democratic. In Africa, many states are still democratic laggards (with an average score of 3.68 
out of the 7 point democracy scale of the Freedom House Index), even if most of the countries 
have democratized in the early 1990s. Countries in Africa where political rights and civil rights 
are still denied to a large segment of the population include Chad, the Republic of Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, and Swaziland. One country in Africa which stands out as 
highly democratic is Mauritius, with a thirty-two-year average Freedom House score of 6.9. This 
is probably a result of its unique British colonial experience and a stipulation in their constitution 
requiring the depoliticization of its military.59 
The rest of the Middle East from Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Syria, Saudi Arabia to the United 
Arab Emirates score below the midpoint of 3.5 over the thirty-two year period (with an average 
score of 3.48 out of the 7 point democracy scale of the Freedom House Index) – rendering the 
region as having mostly autocratic states, partly as a result of its Rentier-state economic system 
and the satisfaction of the mass public with the status quo of state paternalism.60 
Table one shows that the most democratic region among developing states based on raw 
averages of the Freedom House Index assorted by region is Europe, followed by Latin America, 
Asia, Africa and then the Middle East.  
From this vantage point, we can see that most of developing world still has many 
autocratic states that do not guarantee their citizens full political and civil rights. Indeed, states 
that centralize their ruling apparatus accordingly by depriving the civil rights of citizens may be 
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 prone to political stability. By virtue of using force or the threat of punishment, political 
opponents or dissidents of the state are purged, murdered, assassinated, and imprisoned with no 
writ of habeas corpus. Hence, the likelihood for further protest or political instability in the long 
term is nil because the opposition is muzzled, restrained and becomes immobilized. 
To further operationalize the level of democracy in each state, this study also utilizes 
other data sources besides the Freedom House Index. In the interest of adding methodological 
strength to the analysis, the Vanhanen measure of democracy61 and the polity IV measure62 are 
also used in the analysis. T he Vanhanen measure of democracy is considered to be a more 
reliable measure of democracy because of its parsimonious nature of conceptualizing democracy, 
clear coding rules, inter-coder reliability, replicability, and its utilization of an aggregation 
technique that is methodologically sound.63 Scholars consider the Vanhanen measure as 
parsimonious because it is grounded on the Dahlian notion of electoral competition and mass 
participation in voting.64 The Vanhanen measure looks at democracy as a manifestation of how 
competitive national elections are in each sovereign state (the degree to which opposition parties 
have a realistic chance of winning elections) and the extent to which citizens exercise their right 
to suffrage. For example, the competition variable portrays the electoral success of smaller 
parties, that is, the percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or 
presidential elections. The political participation variable portrays voter turnout in each election, 
and is calculated as the percentage of the total population who actually voted in national-level 
elections.65 Vanhanen creates an aggregated index of democracy by multiplying the electoral 
success of smaller parties with the percentage of the actual voting age population that 
participated in voting in a particular year. The two variables are then multiplied together and 
divided by 100 to create a democracy score. Lower score values indicate lower levels of 
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 democracy, whilst higher score values indicate higher levels of democracy. This article derives 
the average Vanhanen score for each of the nation-states in the study from the period years 1975-
2000, which proxies for the level of democracy in each state over a twenty-five-year period.66By 
averaging the Freedom House Index (from 1974-2006) and the Vanhanen measures (from 1975-
2000), this paper obtains the best approximation of the enduring nature of regimes.67   
In the interest of determining if democratic age has any effect on levels of political 
stability, this paper also employs the Polity IV measure. The Polity IV score is a widely used 
measure of democracy that provides the longest measure of democratic performance among 
nation-states with a population of more than 500,000 since the 1900s. The Polity IV score is 
released by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management that is led by 
Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers of the University of Maryland. The democracy measure of 
Polity IV generates a score of -10 to +10 for each state based on the extent to how state 
institutions are regulated, if there are checks and balances imposed on the executive,  if the 
executive branch of the centralized state is constrained and restrained by other institutions in the 
state (including civil society), if potential candidates for political offices are free to run in 
competitive elections regardless of  religion, ethnicity,  or class, if there is competition and 
regulation in political participation, if the nature of the recruitment of political candidates for 
elections is based on equity, and if the state allows associational groups in society to participate 
in the polity without institutional restraints.68 For this study, the overall democratic age score for 
each state is derived by counting the number of years a country scored a +5 through +10 (for at 
least two consecutive years) between 1900 and 2004.69 This method of obtaining the prevailing 
democratic age from the Polity IV index is consistent with previous work that attempted to 
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 operationalize institutionalized democratization.70   Thus higher values on this variable serve as a 
proxy for states with institutionalized democracies.  
The World Bank Governance Indicator measures political stability (Mean1996-2006). 71 
Political stability is measured as the likelihood that the current regime will be overthrown by the 
use of force; specifically the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including the use of domestic 
violence and internal terrorism. This measure utilizes aggregate survey data from the World 
Economic Global Competitiveness Survey, the Business Environmental Risk Intelligence Global 
Risk Service, and the iJET country Security risks ratings. The measure looks at the internal 
politics of the state and the extent to how the regime is threatened by internal violence, civil 
conflict, terrorism, political unrest in the streets, and military intervention. The measure for 
political stability ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, with higher values denoting higher levels of political 
stability.  
Since the World Bank measure is quite crude in relying on an aggregation technique of 
using multiple surveys (based on risk assessments by policy experts)72, it is worthwhile to 
implement another measure of political stability known as the Political Risk Rating provided by 
the Political Risk Group (PRG, hereafter).73 The PRG group provides a yearly ranking of 
political risk status for more than 100 states investigating the component indicators of 
governmental stability, the risk of socio-economic unrest, economic viability, the possibility of 
internal and external conflict, military intervention in politics, religious and ethnic tensions, the 
breakdown in law and order, and the accountability and bureaucratic quality of states. The PRG 
group combines these measures to generate a political risk rating that can range from a minimum 
of less than 50 points to a maximum of 100 points. Accordingly, states that achieve less than 50 
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 points are known to be at risk of a regime breakdown; if state scores somewhere in between 50-
60 points, it is at high risk of a regime breakdown, while those in the 60-70 range are at a 
moderate risk of state failure. Countries that score in the 70-80 range are at a low risk of regime 
collapse, while those that score in the 80-100 range are at the lowest risk category and are 
considered to be politically stable.  The average score for each state from 2000-2006 is utilized 
as another measure for the dependent variable.74 
Bi-Variate Analysis 
This analysis begins by examining whether or not there is a relationship between the level 
of democracy and democratic age on levels of political stability. Indeed, as the main hypothesis 
suggests, higher levels of democracy should elicit higher levels of political instability primarily 
because political pluralism can weaken the state’s capacity to govern effectively. However, as 
shown in table 2, the simple bi-variate analysis suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between levels of democracy and democratic age on the two measures of political stability. This 
suggests that states with higher levels of democracy and longer experiences with democracy are 
more likely to be politically stable over time. The Freedom House measure shows the highest 
level of statistical significance at (b=0.246, p<.01) for the World Bank measure of political 
stability and (b=3.214, p<.01) for the Political Risk Rating. Likewise, the co-efficient for the 
Polity IV measure of democratic age also shows statistical significance at (b=0.018, p<.05) for 
the World Bank measure of political stability and (b=0.186, p<.05) for the Political Risk Rating. 
These findings illustrate that nation-states that have a longer experience with democracy are 
likely to have higher levels of political stability. Furthermore, the Vanhanen measure of 
democracy is also positively correlated with political stability using both the World Bank 
measure at (b=.029, p<.05) and the Political Risk Rating at (b=0.359, p<.05). These results 
demonstrate that a country’s level of democracy (through electoral competition and political 
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 participation) has a direct influence on its level of political stability. It appears that countries with 
lower levels of democracy (autocratic states) are less likely to be politically stable. 
Table 2 Relationship between Democratic Age, Level of Democracy, and Political Stability 
  Bi-Variate Analysis                                                               
 
Political Stability 
Score 
(World Bank 
1996-2006) 
Political Stability 
Score 
(World Bank 
1996-2006) 
Political Stability 
Score 
(World Bank 
1996-2006) 
Political 
Risk Score 
(PRS 
Group 
2000-2006) 
Political 
Risk Score 
(PRS 
Group 
2000-2006) 
Political 
Risk Score 
(PRS Group 
2000-2006) 
Freedom House 
Measure 
(Mean Score 
1974-2006) 
 
0.246** 
      (0.048) 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
3.214**  
 (0.728) 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
Democratic Age  
(Polity IV 
Measure) 
(From 1900-
2004) 
 
-- 
 
0.018* 
(0.007) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
0.186* 
(0.093) 
 
 
-- 
 
Vanhanen 
measure of 
democracy 
(Mean score 
1975-2000) 
 
 
 
 
-- 
 
 
 
 
-- 
 
0.029* 
(0.011) 
 
 
 
 
-- 
 
 
 
 
-- 
 
0.359* 
(0.162) 
Observations 122 122 122 101 101 101 
Note: **p<.01; *p<.05; two tailed test; unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust standard 
errors in parentheses.75 
Nonetheless, no clear patterns can be assumed from this analysis. For instance there is a 
need to control for levels of ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, institutional 
arrangements, and the role of economic development that can also affect variations on the 
dependent variable (political stability). 
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 Multivariate Analysis  
OLS regression analysis is used to determine if levels of democracy and democratic age 
has a positive or negative effect on political stability. The regression analysis also controls for 
levels of economic development (using the natural log of GNP per capita from 1970-1995, as a 
way to obviate the endogeneity problem), ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, an 
institutional legacy of federalism, and parliamentarism. These control variables may adversely 
affect levels of political stability.76  The modeling also employs robust standard errors to mitigate 
problems concerning heteroskedasticity. A test for multi-collinearity by examining the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) scores suggests that there are no collinear variables utilized in the 
modeling as VIF scores are consistently below the numerical value of 2.77  
Table 3 shows consistently that all the measures of democracy are correlated to higher 
levels of political stability, while controlling for other variables. The results show that highly 
democratic states are more likely to experience a decreased likelihood that its regimes will be 
overthrown violently. States with higher levels of democracy are also less prone to ethnic 
tensions, religious tensions, socio-economic grievances, and military intervention as indicated by 
the Political Risk measure of political instability. More specifically, the coefficients of the 
Freedom House Index at (b=0.165, p<.01) for the World Bank Measure of political stability and 
(b=1.828, p<.05) for the Political Risk Rating illustrate that nation-states that have higher levels 
of democracy are more politically stable. The results are confirmed even when one uses 
alternative indices of democracy. The co-efficients for the Vanhanen measure at (b=0.008, 
p<.05) for the World Bank measure and (b=0.136, p<.05) for the Political Risk Rating also 
indicate that democratic states (that have higher levels of electoral competition and political 
participation) have a positive relationship with political stability. Lastly, countries that have had 
a longer experience with democracy (as reflected by the Polity IV measure) tend to be more 
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 politically stable since the coefficients of the Polity IV measure for both the World Bank 
measure and the Political Risk Rating achieve statistical significance at (p<.05) respectively. 
 Thus, states with higher levels of political and civic freedoms are more likely to avoid 
large-scale political violence; whilst states with lower levels of freedom and political rights are 
more likely to encounter political violence. This essentially refutes our aforementioned 
hypothesis. Indeed, democracies promote the relative absence of political violence despite 
theories linking democracy to populist pressure that can destabilize legitimately elected 
governments.  
How do the control variables fare in the modeling? Table three shows that economic 
wealth as measured by the natural log of the GNP exerts a positive influence on levels of 
political stability. Nation states that have higher levels of economic development tend to be more 
politically stable over time (generating statistical significance at p<.05 and p<.01 respectively). 
Ethnic fractionalization elicits a negative parameter coefficient that is statistically significant 
only for the political stability measure of the World Bank (p<.05), suggesting that ethnically 
fragmented polities are susceptible to higher levels of political instability. However, ethnic 
fractionalization as a variable loses its statistical significance when regressed with the Political 
Risk Rating of the PRG group. Furthermore, religious fractionalization does not elicit any 
statistical significance, and its parameter coefficients are positive suggesting that religious 
pluralism in states promote higher levels of political stability which is confirmation of 
secularization theory. For example, adherents of secularization theory argue that religiously 
fragmented states tend to be secular and secularism lessens the impact of religion as an 
ideological force that can incite political and social discord among groups.78 None of the 
institutional variables have any statistically significant relationship with the political stability 
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 measures. Thus, parliamentarism and federalism, institutional arrangements geared to lessen 
regional or group conflict among heterogeneous states79 have substantially no impact on levels of 
political stability. 
Table 3: The Effect of Democracy and Democratic Age on Political Stability OLS Analysis 
 
Political 
Stability 
(1996-2006) 
Political 
Stability 
(1996-2006) 
Political 
Stability 
(1996-2006) 
Political Risk 
Score 
(2000-2006) 
Political Risk 
Score 
 (2000-2006) 
Political Risk 
Score 
 (2000-2006) 
Freedom House 
Measure  
(Mean Score 1974-
2006) 
 
0.165**  
(0.056)      
-- --  
1.828*    
(0.701)      
-- -- 
Democratic Age 
Polity IV Measure 
(From 1900-2004) 
      --  
 0.009*   
 (0.004)      
  
-- --  
0.144*    
(0.071)     
-- 
Vanhanen measure 
of democracy  
(Mean score 1975-
2000) 
      -- --  
0.008*    
(0.003)      
-- --  
0.136*    
(0.059)     
 
Natural  Log of 
GNP  
 
 
0.147* 
( 0.061)     
 
0.198**    
(0.057)      
  
0.199**   
(0.057)      
 
4.258**    
(0.740)      
 
4.793**    
(0.786)     
 
4.701**  
(0.773)      
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-.639*   
(0.278) 
-.604*    
(0.293)     
 -.628*    
(0.290)     
-5.101    
(4.178)    
-4.706    
(4.267)    
-5.076    
(4.378)    
 
 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
 
 
0.301    
(0.304)    
 
 
0.343    
(0.310)      
 
 
0.338    
(0.316)     
 
 
4.898   
(4.558)    
 
 
5.243 
(4.632)     
 
 
4.830   
(4.721)      
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 Federalism 0.177       
(0.236)     
0.180    
(0.238)      
0.257    
(0.244)      
-1.172    
(2.378)     
-2.051    
(2.683)     
-0.627    
(2.431)    
 
Parliamentarism 
 
0.038    
(0.081)      
 
0.123    
(0.080)      
 
0.126    
(0.080)      
 
0.488    
(1.136)      
 
1.376    
(1.001)      
 
1.358   
(1.092)     
 
Constant 
 
-2.006** 
(0.440)    
 
-1.884**    
(0.421)     
 
-1.866**    
(0.421)    
 
 
25.192** 
(6.431)      
 
26.686**     
(6.121)     
 
27.855**    
(6.182)     
 
F-statistic 
 
6.78** 
 
5.30** 
 
4.96** 
 
8.56** 
 
8.90** 
 
8.24** 
Observations 122 122 122 101 101 101 
R Square 0.242 0.207 0.195 0.373 0.353 0.340 
Root MSE 0.748 0.766 0.771 8.916 9.060 9.146 
Note: **p<.01; *p<.05; two tailed test; unstandardized coefficients are reported, robust standard errors in 
parentheses.80 
To further gauge the impact of democracy on political stability, it is worthwhile to 
discuss predicted estimates for each measure of democracy on the two measures of political 
stability using Long and Freese’s SPOST function.81  Figure 1-A and Figure 1-B shows that 
higher levels of democracy (using the maximalist measure of democracy provided by the 
Freedom House) is positively correlated to higher levels of political stability (and lower levels of 
political risk), while holding other control variables constant at their means and modes. Even 
with the Vanhanen measure, as shown in figures 2-A and 2-B (which uses a more minimalist 
criteria of measuring democracy), the same positive effect on political stability is documented, 
while holding other control variables at their means and modes. But what is the impact of 
democratic age on levels of political stability? Figures 3-A and 3-B provide evidence that polities 
that have a longer experience with democratic politics (as measured by the polity score over time 
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 since 1900-2004) tend to be stable politically over time, while holding other control variables 
constant at their means and modes. 
Predicted Estimates: The Effect of Level of Democracy on Political Stability 
Figure 1-A Using Freedom House Scores 
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 Figure 1-B 
 
Figure 2-A 
 Using the Vanhanen measure of democracy 
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 Figure 2-B 
 
 
 
Figure 3-A  
Using Polity Measure (Democratic Age) 
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Figure 3-B 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The relationship between democracy and political stability among developing states has 
always raised an empirical conundrum that remains unresolved.  Using a model of developing 
states with varied regime types, it is discovered that polities with higher levels of democracy are 
more likely to be politically stable. Further, states that have a longer history of democratic 
politics are less likely to see a violent overthrow of their regimes, because they have lower levels 
of political risk– ranging from ethnic and religious tensions, socio-economic grievances in the 
population, internal and external threats on the regime, and direct military intervention. The 
results of this study provide countervailing evidence against the arguments held by many 
theorists who posit that democracy is prone to political instability due to the nature of political 
pluralism and the rise of populist policies that threaten the state’s capacity to govern effectively.  
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 Why is it that democratic politics promotes stability while autocratic polities are prone to 
higher levels of political instability? The answer may be based on the nature of authoritarian 
regimes that continuously repress their people. As Gurr posited, levels of oppression may cause 
the population to hold grievances and induce them to rebel.82 The repression of political and civil 
rights by the state can in fact facilitate an increase in riots, protests, and civil disturbances aimed 
against autocracies. Furthermore, we can glean some validation from the work of James Scott 
who claimed that in societies where power is centralized in the hands of the few, the weak and 
the disenfranchised will find a way to challenge or supplant the oppressiveness and exclusivity of 
the system.83 This points to the civil disturbances that many despotic regimes have experienced 
in the past few years.  
  Since the late 1990s and up until today, spates of riots have occurred in Myanmar in 
reaction to the Junta’s inability to control inflation. Most recently in 2007, the sudden increase in 
the price of basic commodities spurred pro-democracy movements that many Buddhist monks 
have joined. This is not new to Myanmar, as periods of political unrest blighted the early years of 
the junta regime. Could it be that repression in autocracies brings about political violence and 
instability? Anecdotal evidence in China shows that unrest in the cities periodically happen, 
mostly led by students who have protested against the inefficient bureaucracy of the educational 
system.84 In Saudi Arabia, there is always a constant threat to the royal family of the Saud 
dynasty coming from the Wahabi faction that preaches against the close ties between the royal 
family and the United States– in particular allowing US forces to occupy Saudi soil. The Wahabi 
movement does not have much legitimacy among the Saudi mass public, but it has an organized 
presence in the Shura council (a consultative branch that the King consults on a daily basis). 
Experts claim that the extreme Wahabi movement is a direct threat to the stability of the Saud 
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 family if its social contract in preserving the primacy of Sharia law fails.85 If that occurs a more 
fundamentalist regime may dominate the Saudi political system, which may directly see factional 
conflict between liberal and conservative forces—which could theoretically lead to political 
violence.86 In fact, the 1996 bombings of the Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia is an indication of 
the increased militancy of the Wahabi movement, when the armed group Hezbollah Al-Hejaz 
engaged in terror attacks to weaken the legitimacy of the Saud family, which continues until 
today. In Yemen, Islamic fundamentalism has been on the rise since the early 1980s and political 
riots are commonplace as a result of high food prices and commodities and the realization that oil 
resources are incapable of offsetting inflation. Thus, political stability is less likely to dominate 
the Yemeni political landscape as oil reserves dwindle.87 Furthermore, in North Korea and Cuba, 
long-entrenched dictators have withstood economic sanctions from the West aimed at targeting 
their regimes for political change and democratization. However, there is the constant threat of 
political instability and the erosion of autocracy’s legitimacy—particularly in the leadership 
structure. Because of press censorship, we do not know the extent of mass political protests in 
these countries. Political unrest is not covered by the western media, but human rights abuses are 
documented and are on the increase in these two countries. Increased reports of human rights 
violations in these countries are an indication of public resentment and political unrest in the 
streets aimed against state repression.88 The political turbulence and armed conflict in Syria 
(which has been ongoing for many years and only now has achieved significant media attention 
as a result of the Arab spring uprisings) is also a case that corroborates the findings of this study. 
Syria’s autocratic system headed by an ethnic minority royal family and Alawi-based Baath 
Party led to the mass mobilization of an aggrieved and disenfranchised majority population that 
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 has been restive in many years.89   In conclusion, autocratic regimes have a natural tendency to 
encounter anti-state movements that directly targets the legitimacy and stability of the state. 
What is the theoretical link between dictatorships and the potential for more political 
violence and instability? As Lichbach argues, the increased use of violent coercion by state 
elements in a dictatorship can lead into large scale political instability.90 Lichbach asserts that, 
“An increase in a government regime’s repression of non-violent activity may reduce the level of 
non-violent activities of opposition groups but it may increase the level of violent activities 
against the state. This results because the relative costs of non-violent activities to the opposition 
group have been raised.”91 This same perspective is also highlighted by Federico Ferrera’s 
analysis of Myanmar where he shows that increasing repression of an autocratic regime may 
facilitate the mobilization of forces among societal groups that can threaten the state’s legitimacy 
and thus foment prolonged periods of political instability.92 In the end, repression breeds 
rebellion, protests, and organized movements against an autocratic political system. 
 Finally, this study has several limitations which have implications for future research. 
First, of course is the inability to address exhaustively all independent variables that may 
influence variations on levels of political stability. For instance, future research should address 
whether or not large scale income inequality is at all related in fomenting higher levels of 
political instability among developing states as argued by prominent scholars.93 Recent work has 
also addressed that the forces of globalization, neoliberalism, economic liberalization, and the 
politics of austerity measures have precipitated an increase in political violence in Latin America 
and Africa.94 It is worthy of empirical investigation to test if the forces of globalization itself has 
a deleterious effect on political stability globally. 
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 Appendix 1 
 
Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard  Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Political Stability score 122 -0.433 0.838 -2.538 0.9566 
Political Risk Measure 101 62.133 10.923 23.50 84.00 
Polity IV Democratic 
Age (1900-2004) 122 7.926 11.385 0 63.00 
Vanhanen level of 
democracy 
(1975-2000) 
122 6.033 6.245 0 25.908 
Freedom House level of 
Democracy (1974-2006) 122 4.230 1.364 1 6.90 
Ethnic Fractionalization 122 0.503 0.248 0 0.930 
Religious Fractionalization 122 0.417 0.234 0.002 0.860 
GDP per capital (natural log; 
1970-1995) 122 6.694 1.143 4.223 9.948 
Parliamentarism 122 1.483 0.773 1 3 
Federalism 122 0.122 0.329 0 1 
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